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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines judicial attitude to environmental litigation and access to 
environmental justice in Nigeria. The paper employs expository analysis as its methodology in 
discussing the theme. Essentially, the paper finds that environmental litigations in Nigeria are 
bedeviled by legal technicalities such that victims of environmental pollution and degradation are 
ultimately denied access to justice. Ranging from issue of locus to territorial and subject matter 
jurisdiction, victims of oil spill and environmental degradation are often left without judicial 
remedies. The paper finds that consequently, the people of the Niger Delta are increasingly losing 
confidence in the judiciary both at the domestic and international level. This has heightened militancy 
and youths’ restiveness in the area leading to loss of revenues and sometimes lives.  
The paper notes with concern the recent trend of outsourcing justice, as evident in attempts 
to bring environmental pollution cases in Nigeria before domestic courts abroad. For example the 
celebrated case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell, heard in United States of America. Kiobel is 
arguably a setback to this approach of searching for environmental justice before international courts 
and a reminder on the need to look inwards. This paper calls for judicial flexibility and a more 
proactive approach to legal reasoning by Nigerian courts, in order to put environmental matters on 
the front burner of our national discourse. Unless and until environmental justice is entrenched in 
Nigeria through judicial activism, Governmental inertia and unwillingness to provide remedies for 
victims of environmental degradation may continue to fuel militancy in the years ahead. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since 1956 when oil was first discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri in 
present day Bayelsa State, exploration activities have brought with it, grave 
environmental problems. Oil spill, environmental pollution and degradation, 
destruction of landscape among other issues have continued to plague the 
environment leading to loss of arable farm lands, aesthetic environment, fishing 
activities, revenue and sometimes lives.1 The people in their resolve to protect their 
environment have adopted various mechanisms ranging from militancy to dialogue, 
and from open confrontations with companies operating in the area, to institution of 
court actions. In the search for justice, there have been frustrations and dashed 
hopes. Legal technicalities such as locus standi and jurisdiction both at the domestic 
level and international level as epitomized in Kiobel on the one side, and poverty on 
the other have painfully been exploited by certain unscrupulous multinational 
corporations to deny victims of environmental pollutions, justice. 2 
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1 John Vidal, ‘Niger Delta Oil spills Clean-up will take 30 years, says UN’, The Guardian, Thursday 
August 4 2011. 
2 No. 06- 4800, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19382, at 1 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010). 
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Thus Nigeria, the most populous nation in black Africa, rich in oil but 
underdeveloped has witnessed a monumental share of environmental problems 
which justify local and international attention.3 The need to use law as a vehicle in 
the regulation, management and protection of the environment has thus become 
paramount.4 
 Unfortunately, the quests to attain redress for environmental problems have 
not been the most straightforward endeavor in Nigeria. Aggrieved parties therefore 
resort to litigating environmental problems before international courts.5 Using the 
jurisprudence evolved in the US case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell (Kiobel) as a 
reference point, this paper discusses how extraterritorial litigation may not be a long-
term ingenious solution to the problem of attaining environmental justice in 
Nigeria,.6 This paper analyzes the legal and technical challenges perennially faced by 
environmental litigants in Nigeria, such as Locus Standi, Pre-Action Notice and 
Limitation of Action. The paper argues in favour of a more flexible interpretation of 
the law in order deliver justice to victims of environmental problems in Nigeria. It 
argues that the current heightened activities of oil thefts and sustained militancy in 
the Niger Delta would remain and may rise on a geometric scale if justice is 
continually denied to victims of environmental nay oil exploration in Nigeria. It is 
imperative for the Nigerian judiciary to play a more proactive role in delivering 
environmental justice to the common man and woman. For Nigeria to turn the 
corner, Nigerian judges will need to be more flexible in interpreting the law and in 
exhibiting zealous judicial activism whenever issues of environmental abuse are 
brought before them. 
 
2. SCOPE OF ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA 
AND THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
Activities of oil companies in Nigeria may result to both civil and criminal 
liabilities. As such, environmental litigation can take many forms, including civil 
actions based on tort, contract or property law, criminal prosecutions, public interest 
litigation, enforcement of fundamental human rights or complex issues which may 
arise when cases involve transboundary environmental harms.7 
At common law, an action in an environmental litigation may be based on 
either negligence, nuisance or under the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher.8 Each of 
these common law actions, have some essential requirements which, the plaintiff has 
the onus of proving.9 These torts can be used to curb environmental pollution and 
promote conservation. Apart from the problems that an award of damages is 
                                                
3 See UN Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya  - Africa Environment Outlook, News Release, 
2002/50, pp.1-4. 
4 Ibid at pp.262-3. 
5 Ibid at pp. 474-480. 
6 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., No. 06- 4800, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19382, at 1 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 17, 2010). Nigerian plaintiffs filed Kiobel in 2002, alleging that Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
and Shell Transport and Trading Company, through a subsidiary, collaborated with the Nigerian 
government to commit human rights violations to suppress lawful protests against oil exploration in 
the Ogoni region of the Niger Delta. In 2006, the district court granted in part and denied in part the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the suit. In particular, the district court granted the motion to dismiss 
for the claims of aiding and abetting extrajudicial killing, forced exile, property destruction, and 
violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association, holding that customary international 
law did not define these violations with the specificity required by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692 (2004). 
7 Tobi, N, supra note 6. 
8 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng Rep 737 (Ex. 1865). 
9 Ladan supra note 4, Chapters 3 and 4. 
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dependent on certain technicalities and that such damages may not even be sufficient 
to redress the harm, the major problem with case law is that it depends on a willing 
plaintiff. Where the litigation costs are too high or because of litigation apathy, or 
lack of means these torts go unchecked. More telling is the fact that they cannot be 
used on an efficient basis for public regulation of the environment. This explains 
why much of environmental law is statute based.10 
             Many environmental legislation impose strict liability or and provide for 
compensation rather than damages.11 For example, the National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act (NESREA 
Act), together with other environmental statutes form the backbone of Nigeria’s 
environmental law.12 A critical analysis of the NESREA Act and selected 
environmental statutes however demonstrate why the legal mechanisms in place for 
protecting the Niger Delta have failed. For example, it is difficult to understand why 
the oil and gas industry, arguably the greatest environmental threat to Nigeria, is 
excluded from so many of the NESREA Act’s provisions. 
           Part 2 of the NESREA Act, including sections 7 and 8, detail the functions 
and powers of the Agency and council.13 These sections are most illustrative of the 
exceptions in place for the oil and gas industry. Section 7 provides exceptions in five 
of its thirteen provisions, requiring the Agency to: 
 
1. Enforce compliance with regulations on the importation, exportation, 
production, distribution, storage, sale, use, handling and disposal of hazardous 
chemicals and waste other than in the oil and gas sector; 
2. Enforce through compliance monitoring, the environmental 
regulations and standards on noise, air, land, seas, oceans and other water 
bodies other than in the oil and gas sector; 
3. Create public awareness and provide environmental education on 
sustainable environmental management, promote private sector compliance 
with environmental regulations other than in the oil and gas sector and publish 
general scientific or other data resulting from the performance of its 
functions.14 
4. Conduct public investigations on pollution and the degradation of 
natural resources, except investigations on oil spillage, 
5. Submit for the approval of the Minister, proposals for the evolution 
and review of existing guidelines, regulations and standards on environment 
other than in the oil and gas sector including atmospheric protection, air quality, 
ozone depleting substances, noise control, effluent limitations, water quality, 
waste management and environmental sanitation, erosion and flood control, 
coastal zone management, dams and reservoirs, watershed, deforestation and 
bush burning, other forms of pollution and sanitation, and control of 
hazardous substances and removal control methods, 
6. Develop environmental monitoring networks, compile and synthesize 
environmental data from all sectors other than in the oil and gas sector at national 
and international levels.15 
                                                
10See Ajomo and Adewale, Environmental Law and Sustainable Development in Nigeria, (ed.) (1994); 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, at pp. 11-66. 
11 Ibid. 
12 National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act No. 
(25) (2007) 94:92 O.G., A635 (Nigeria) [hereinafter NESREA Act]. 
13 Ibid part 2. 
14 Ibid section 7. 
15 Ibid section 8. 
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Thus, the exceptions in part two bar the Agency from enforcing hazardous 
waste regulations in the oil and gas sector. The Agency cannot monitor, license, 
research, survey, study, or audit the sector. It may not propose evolution of the 
environmental regulations for, promote compliance in, or conduct investigations of 
the oil and gas sector. Thus, while the Agency is technically allowed to ‘enforce 
compliance with laws, guidelines, policies and standards on environmental matters’ it 
may not observe the oil and gas sector in any way to determine the level of 
compliance by stakeholders.16 
              The NESREA Act provides the oil and gas sector additional exceptions in 
sections 24, 29, and 30. Under section 24, although the Agency may review effluent 
limitations on existing point sources,17 it is barred from making regulations on 
effluent limitations on new and existing point sources in the oil and gas sector.  
Section 29 states: The Agency shall co-operate with other Government agencies for 
the removal of any pollutant excluding oil and gas related ones discharged into the 
Nigerian environment and shall enforce the application of best clean-up technology 
currently available and implementation of best management practices as 
appropriate.18 Nigeria’s sole environmental agency is thereby inexplicably prevented 
from participating in the cleanup of any pollution caused by the oil and gas industry. 
                Finally, section 30 prohibits Agency officers from entering and searching 
all oil and gas facilities even with a warrant issued by a court.19 This section further 
inhibits the Agency from enforcing any environmental regulations in the oil and gas 
sector. Instead of simply declaring that the oil and gas sector is outside of the 
Agency’s purview, the NESREA Act gives the Agency the power to enforce 
environmental regulations in the oil and gas sector but robs it of the ability to 
actually do so.  
The effects of these exemption provisions are that the supposed 
environmental regulator in Nigeria has not legal basis or power to investigate and 
punish environmental default in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. This has been a major 
barrier to victims of oil pollution in the Niger-Delta who are faced with the brazen 
reality that NESREA may not provide any haven after all. They are therefore left 
with one major option: to go to court and seek redress. As we will discuss in what 
follows, technical and procedural requirements of establishing jurisdiction and locus 
standi have equally left litigants in Nigeria with serious if not more issues to ponder 
on.  
 
2.1. Jurisdictional Issues in Environmental Litigation. 
 It is trite that a court will only deal with cases referred to it. In dealing with 
such cases the court first assumes jurisdiction. Assumption of jurisdiction by the 
court entails the fulfillment of certain requirements. These requirements are 
condition precedent or due process in the determination of a dispute. This is because 
where action is not initiated by due process of law, the proceedings before the court 
is a nullity.20 The Supreme Court held in Yahaya v. The State that once a mandatory 
                                                
16 Ibid section 7. 
17Ibid section 24. The NESREA Act defines a point source as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduct, well, discrete 
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation or vessel or other floating craft 
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 
18 Ibid section 29. 
19 Ibid section 30. 
20 See Jika v. Akuson (2006) ALL FWLR (pt.293) p. 276. 
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provision of the law is not followed, the trial is rendered null and void ab initio.21 
Uwais, CJN held that the mandatory provisions must be complied with before the 
commencement of trial. It is the fulfillment of the law that gives jurisdiction to the 
court to try the case before it.22 
The pre-conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction on any case are: whether 
the plaintiff has a cause of action, which is valid and enforceable by law. In other 
words, the plaintiff must have sufficient interest and locus standi in the matter.23 Again 
where the suit is instituted in a representative capacity, there must be authorization24 
and the persons who are to be represented and those representing them should have 
same interest in the matter.25 Where there is need for a Pre-action Notice, the 
plaintiff must serve such pre-action notice.26 The court held in Asogwa v. Chukwu27 
that where there is no issuance of pre-action notice as provided by the law, there is 
lacking a condition precedent, which could not give the courts assumption of 
jurisdiction. In Teno Engineering Ltd v. Adisa the court held that service of court 
process is a condition precedent to vesting jurisdiction in the court.28 Also in Okolo v. 
U.B.N29 the court held that payment of filing fees is a condition precedent to the 
courts assumption of jurisdiction.  
Where there is time limit for commencement of the action the victim must 
comply with the time limited for the commencement of action. The court held Akibu 
v. Azeez that in limitation of action, time begins to run from the date cause of action 
arose.30 Time for commencement of action is of essence to the successful institution 
of an action in court. In certain instances, the effect of the hazard does not 
immediately become obvious. This happens in cases of oil spillage, where damage to 
the soil though apparent may not be fully understood. Such instance may raise the 
issue of when cause of action arose. In dealing with this, the Supreme Court in Aremo 
11 v. Adekanye held that a fresh cause of action arises from time to time as often as 
the damage is caused.31 In all these cases, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
                                                
21 (2002) 3 M.J.S.C 103. 
22 Where there is non-compliance by the plaintiff, the defendant may waive is right. In such instance, 
the court can assume procedural jurisdiction. 
23 In oil spillage cases, the right to fishery in tidal water is recognized in law. In ELF Nigeria limited v. 
Sillo & Anor (1994)6 N.W.L.R (pt. 350) 258, the Supreme Court relying on Adeshina v. Lemour (1965) 1 
All N.L.R. 233 held that the plaintiff has proved the existence of their common right of fishery in tidal 
waters and its violation and was therefore entitled  to damages. See generally Theodore Okonkwo, 
The Law of Environmental Liability (Lagos: Afrique Environmental Development & Education, 
2003), p.115. locus standi is the right of the party to appear and be heard on the question before the 
court- Per Bello, CJN in Senator Adesanya v. President of Nigeria (1981) 2 N.C.L.R 388; See also Edjerode v. 
Ikine [2002]2 M.J.S.C 163; A-G Federation v. A-G of the 36 States [2001] 6M J.S.C 69; Arabambi v. A.B.I. 
Ltd [2006]3 M.J.S.C 61; Yesufu v. Governor Edo State [2001] 5m.J.S.C 128. 
24 Ndule v. Ibezim [2002] 12 M.J.S.C 150. 
25 Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited v. Chief Otoko & Ors. (1990) 6 N.W.L.R 
(pt 159) 693; Amos v. Shell B.P. Nigeria Limited (1974) 4 E.C.S.L.R 486; Ejem v. Offiah (2000) 7 
N.W.L.R (pt. 666) 662. 
26 See section 29(2) Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act. 
27 (2003) 4 N.W.L.R (pt. 811) 540 at 552; Mobil Producing (Nigeria) Unlimited v. LASEPA (2002)2 
M.J.S.C 69; Eze v. Okechukwu (200302 M.J.S.C. 188; Abakaliki Local Government Council v. Abakaliki Rice 
Mills Owners Enterprises Nigeria (1990) 6 N.W.L.R. (pt. 155) 182; University of Ife v. Fawehinmi Construction 
Co. Ltd (1991) 7 N.W.L.R (pt. 201) 26; Nigeria Cement Co. Ltd v. Nigeria Railway Corporation & Anor 
(1992) 1 N.W.L.R (Pt. 22) 747; Amadi v. N.N.P.C (2000) 10 N.W.L.R (Pt. 674) 6; Nigerian Ports Plc V. 
Oseni (2000) 8 N.W.L.R (Pt. 669) 410. 
28[2005] 7 M.J.S.C 89; A-G Adamawa State v. A-G Federation [2006] I M.J.S.C 1 Sken Consult v. Ukey 
(1981) 1 S.C. 6; A.I.E.V. Adebayo [2003] 12 M.J.S.C 44. 
29 [2004] 2 M.J.S.C 69. 
30 (2003) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 814) 643; Aremo 11 v. Adekanye [2004] 11 M.J.S.C 11 
31 Supra. 
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determination of the importance of the rules of proceedings and the court 
emphatically stated as illustrated that the rules of court procedure must be followed. 
Where the rules of procedure have been complied with, the court may begin its 
assignment with ascertaining whether it has authority to determine the case. A court 
with competence to deal with a case is said to have jurisdiction to determine the case. 
In 7up v. Abiola32 the Supreme Court held that ‘it is trite that in all matters before the 
court the fundamental one is the issue of jurisdiction which must first be determined 
before anything else otherwise all proceeding relating thereto will be a nullity and an 
exercise in futility.33 
Determining jurisdiction over a case involves a consideration of facts. The 
reason this is important is that in addition to filing a case on time, a plaintiff has to 
file it in a proper court. The Supreme Court held in Abu v. Odugbo34 that what 
determines jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit is the claim of the plaintiff. In 
Menakaya v. Menakaya35 the Supreme Court held that the competence of a court or of 
the proceedings is a fundamental issue, which cannot be waived. According to the 
Supreme Court, it is important to consider the issue of jurisdiction first because 
where a court takes upon itself to exercise jurisdiction it does not possess, its 
decision amounts to a nullity. This problem of jurisdiction can even be raised at any 
stage of the proceedings.36 The move by the Supreme Court is in recognition of the 
necessity of authority of the Court and the need to caution victims and prevent at an 
early stage of the proceedings in the case, the hardship they are likely to encounter 
where the court has no jurisdiction. The victim therefore ensures that he files the 
case in the court with authority. Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may only be 
inconvenience if the victim has time to re-file the lawsuit in the proper court. But if 
the time limit on filing the suit runs before the suit is filed, the mistake in filing the 
suit in the proper court may mean that the Defendant can have the suit thrown out 
permanently. 
In Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd v. Abel Isaiah,37the Supreme 
Court sitting in its appellate authority was called upon to decide the following: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeal’s decision that the High Court 
had jurisdiction is right. 
2. Whether the decision that the defendant was negligent in not 
constructing an oil trap was right. 
3. Whether the decision that the oil spillage was in fact massive 
spillage of crude oil from the appellants pipeline. 
4. Whether the damages confirmed by the court is a proper 
estimate of the losses suffered by the plaintiffs/respondents. 
5. Whether the court was right in upholding the damages 
awarded based on the unchallenged expert evidence of the 
respondents. 
6. Whether the court below was right in affirming that the case 
was properly litigated in a representative capacity and whether the 
case is challenged under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.38 
 
                                                
32 [2001] 5 M.J.S.C 93 at 97. 
33 Jurisdiction of the Court-General Information. Available at http://euopa:eu.int/comm./justice-
home/ejn/jusrisdiction-courts-gen-en.htm accessed 21 August 2013. 
34 [2001] 7 M.J.S.C 87 at 91. 
35 [2001] 8 M.J.S.C 50. 
36 Eze v. A-G Rivers State [2002] 1 M.J.S.C 87 
37 (2001) 5 S.C. (Pt. 11) 1. 
38 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep 737 (Ex. 1865). 
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The Supreme Court stated that the main issue in the case was whether the 
Court of Appeal was right in holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to try the 
case. In the reasoning of the Supreme Court, the question of whether the court has 
jurisdiction to try the case can be raised at any stage of the trial and it was important 
to consider the issue of jurisdiction first because if it succeeds, that decision will 
determine the appeal. 
The case arose from an appeal by the defendant/appellant who was 
dissatisfied with the decision of the court below. The facts of this case are that in July 
1988, an old tree fell on the defendant/appellant’s oil pipeline and indented it. The 
said indention hindered the free flow of crude oil through the said pipelines which 
ran across the plaintiff/respondents swamp land and surrounding farmlands. It 
became necessary for installing a new one. The defendant/appellant engaged the 
services of contractor to repair the dented pipeline. In the cause of the repairs, the 
defendant neglected to construct an oil trap (a device constructed in the soil for the 
purpose of trapping oil in the course of such repairs) so that crude oil freely spilled 
onto the plaintiff/respondent’s swampland and polluted the surrounding farmlands, 
streams and fishponds. The plaintiff claimed from the defendant at the High Court 
sitting at Isiokpo, Rivers State the sum of N22 million for damages resulting from 
the defendant’s negligent activities. The trial court awarded N22 million to the 
plaintiff for the damage and loss caused by the defendant’s oil exploration activities. 
The defendant appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal. The 
defendant/appellant has now come to the Supreme Court contesting the decision of 
the court below. 
At the Supreme Court, the issue for decision was whether the State High 
Court has jurisdiction in claims pertaining to mines and minerals including oil fields 
etc by virtue of the Federal High Court (Amendment) Act39 and section 230 (1) (0) 
of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993. The 
Supreme Court was therefore called to determine whether the facts of the case fell 
within the definition of matters connected with or pertaining to mines and minerals, 
including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. 
Countries have different rules of jurisdiction that determine the distribution 
of competence among the courts in the territory. In Nigeria, jurisdiction is 
determined by law and the limit of the court’s authority. This authority may be 
extended or restricted by law. A limitation may be either to the kind and nature of 
actions and matter of which the particular court has cognizance. In Edjerode v Ikine40 
the Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction of the court cannot lightly be taken away 
except by very clear words an intention validly made. A limitation of jurisdiction can 
come into force at any time with or without reservation of jurisdiction over pending 
cases. Where there is reservation, all those cases reserved stand to the extent of the 
reservation.41 In Insurance Co. v. Richie42 it was held that when a law-conferring 
jurisdiction is limited or repealed without any reservation of jurisdiction over 
pending cases, all pending cases fall with the law. 
The power of the legislature to limit or oust jurisdiction of the court in the 
exact degrees and character, it may seem proper, is not challenged. The Supreme 
Court in Edjerode v. Ikine43 stated that the courts are precluded from questioning the 
                                                
39 Decree No. 60 of 1991. 
40 [2002] 2 M.J.S.C 163 at 167. 
41 See Bruner v. U.S 343, U.S. 112; Beale v. U.S 182 f.2D 565 (1950). 
42 5 Wall 541 pp. 115-117. Available at http://caselawlp.findlaw.com/Cgi-
bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=12 accessed 12 August 2013. 
43 Supra n. 57. 
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capacity and power of the authorities in promulgating laws. However such instance 
of limitation or ouster of jurisdiction created problem in the Abel Isaiah’s case. In that 
case, the argument of the counsel for the appellant was that by the provisions of 
section 7 (b), 7(3) and 7(5) of the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree No. 60 
of 1991, the jurisdiction of the State High Court has been ousted in claims pertaining 
to mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural 
gas. The Supreme Court considered whether the construction and maintenance of an 
oil pipeline is part of mining operations. It referred to the Petroleum Act 1960 and 
the Oil Pipelines Act 1956 and found that the most important aspect of oil mining 
operation is the construction of oil pipeline.44 The court therefore concluded that the 
construction operation and maintenance of an oil pipeline by a holder of oil 
prospecting license is an act pertaining to mining operations. From the facts 
presented by the parties, the court also stated that the oil spilled while the repairs 
were carried out. The installation of pipelines, producing, treating and transmitting of 
crude oil to the storage tanks which led to the accident arose from or was connected 
with or pertaining to mines, and mineral etc. so the claim falls within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. Learned counsel for the respondents argued 
that the law ousting jurisdiction of the court could not affect the claim before the 
court because the cause of action arose before the law came into force. He submitted 
that the Supreme Court has stated severally45 that the applicable law to an action is 
the law existing when the cause of action arose. The Supreme Court rose up to the 
challenge and held that while it was correct that the cause of action arose before the 
promulgation of the law; the trial was in progress when the law was made and as 
such the law could not operative retroactively to affect the outcome of the case. 
From that moment when the law was signed, the jurisdiction of the trial court was 
ousted. 
It is necessary therefore to identify when a law is said to come into force and 
the effect of an amendment. In that case, the laws conferring jurisdiction in oil-spill 
cases started with the Federal High Court Act46 through the Federal High Court 
(Amendment) Decree No. 60 1991,47 the  Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree 
No. 16 199248 to the constitution (Suspension & Modification) Decree No. 107, 
199349 and section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution. By virtue of the provisions 
of section 2 of the Interpretation Act50 ‘an act is passed when the president assents to 
the Bill for the Act.’ An enactment of the National Assembly comes into force on 
the day the Act is passed. In Adewunmi v A-G. Ekiti State51 the Supreme Court held 
that an amendment takes effect form the date of the original document sought to be 
amended. In Provost v. Edun52 the Supreme Court held that it is a valid canon of 
statutory interpretation that an amendment takes effect from the commencement 
date of the original or amended statute. The Supreme Court found that the judgment 
of the High Court in the Abel Isaiah case was delivered on 11 March 1994 after the 
coming into force of the Decree No. 60 1991 and Decree 107 of 1993 and was 
caught by the provisions of the Decrees. Ogweugbu, J.S.C, stated that in determining 
                                                
44 Supra n. 54 at 1. 
45 Adesina v. Kola (1993) 6 N.W.L.R (Pt. 298) 182 at 185. 
46 Chapter 134 L.F.N 1990. 
47 Now Act which commenced 26 August, 1993; See the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree 
No. 16 1992 and Statutory Instrument No. 9, 1993. 
48 Which commenced January 1, 1992. 
49 Which came into force on 17 November, 1993. 
50 Chapter 123 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
51 [2001] 2 M.J.S.C 1. 
52 [2004] 4 M.J.S.C 94. 
157 
 
jurisdiction in this case, it will be necessary to consider the provisions of the various 
enactments including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
dealing with jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. He analyzed section 7 of the 
Federal High Court Act,53 the principal Act that sets out the jurisdiction of the court. 
By this the court has no jurisdiction in oil spillage cases. Decree No. 60 of 1991 
amended the Act and inserted a new section 7 vesting such jurisdiction in the court. 
Thereafter, in 1992 Decree No. 16 suspended the 1991 provisions removing the said 
jurisdiction and in 1993, Statutory Instruments No. 9 of 1993 restored Decree 60 of 
1991. In 1993, Decree No. 107 substituted a new subsection 1 for section 230 (1) of 
the 1979 Constitution also granting exclusive jurisdiction while section 251 (1) (n) of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Federal High Court. The judgment of the State High Court on the 
case was delivered on 11 march 1994 after the coming into force of Decree 60 1991 
and Decree 107 1993. Having regard to the state of the law and the facts of this case, 
oil spillage from the defendants dented oil pipeline is a thing associated with, related 
to, arising from or ancillary to mines and minerals, including oil fields etc. The words 
of the Decree are plain and unambiguous and must be given their natural and 
ordinary meaning. By the provisions of Decree No. 60 of 1991, the Rivers State High 
Court and the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit that 
gave rise to this appeal. 
This is good judgment. If by virtue of section 2 of the Interpretation Act a 
law comes into force on the day it is made, then the law ousting jurisdiction of the 
court had commenced before the judgment was delivered. As such from the date of 
delivery of the judgment, the court lacked both the jurisdiction to continue with the 
case and capacity to deliver the judgment. By virtue of section 4 of the Interpretation 
Act,54 the judgment was made under an amended law.55 The decision of the Supreme 
Court is correct in law. The counsel for the plaintiffs was not sensitive enough to 
realize that the State High Court’s jurisdiction had been ousted from August and 
November 1993. All he should have done was go to the Federal High Court. He 
committed serious blunder by continuing with the case in a court that had no 
jurisdiction. 
With the amendment of the law, the exercise of authority by a court whose 
jurisdiction is ousted is moot. According to S.M.A. Belgore, J.S.C,56 once jurisdiction 
of a court is ousted, the court assuming jurisdiction does so as an exercise either in 
moot or as an academic exercise but certainly in futility. In Adewunmi v. A.G. Ekiti 
State57 the Supreme Court held that the court is not given to make moot decisions or 
decide hypothetical cases, which have no bearing. It should be noted however, 
though the exercise of further authority by the court is moot, the issues in 
controversy in the case are not moot. This is because there is still opportunity for the 
determination of the unresolved issues in the dispute since the case was not decided 
on the merits.58 According to section 6 of the Interpretation Act, the repeal of an 
enactment shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or 
incurred under the enactment. Usually in ouster of jurisdiction laws, the substance of 
these rights or obligations does not change. What changes is the court which the 
rights or obligations can be enforced. Thus there exists not merely the speculative 
                                                
53 Chapter 134 L.F.N. 1990. 
54 Chapter 123 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
55 See Barry and 2 Ors v. Obi A. Eric and 3 Ors. (1998) 8 N.W.L.R (Pt. 562) 404. 
56 In Abel Isaiah case. 
57 Supra. 
58 Except cases that have become statute – barred. 
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possibility of invocation of law in some future dispute but also the presence of an 
existing unresolved dispute.59 The issues involved in oil spillage disputes are usually 
continuing and their consideration may not be defeated by short-term orders capable 
of repetition, yet evading review. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Abel Isaiah’s case may not be 
unconnected with the fact that the subject matter of the dispute revolved on federal 
law60 and therefore by the provisions of section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, a 
case that raises a federal question ought to be filed in a federal court. The court 
stated in the case that in establishing whether the construction and maintenance of 
an oil pipeline is part of mining operations, it is relevant to refer to the practice of 
the oil prospecting license holders during mining operations and these have been 
described in the Petroleum Act and Oil Pipe Lines Act. A.B. Wali, J.S.C said ‘from 
the pleadings and the relevant statutory laws cited and relied upon, the High Court 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case as it is a matter covered by the Petroleum Act 
1960 and the Pipe Lines Act 1956.’ This decision is in line with what obtains in some 
countries. In the U.S, Federal Courts decide cases that involve the U.S government, 
the U.S Constitution or Federal Laws etc.  
However, the query is – was such an amendment necessary at that point in 
time? Was it not proper that a procedure that will promote a review in view of the 
difficulties and sufferings already borne by the plaintiffs should have been put in 
place in relation to pending cases? If the case is started de novo as may be expected, 
aside the time wasted, the cost and pain on the plaintiffs, how do they carry on with 
the issue of proof? Proof of the alleged claims will be a very difficult task because oil 
spillage case is not just a mere civil wrong. It is a serious hazard that can lead to 
hunger, poverty, and disease epidemic and even death. With the weaker position of 
the plaintiffs, what is the possibility of de novo case at the Federal High Court? It 
appears that the Supreme Court judges also thought through these considerations 
especially where there was no denial as to the happening of the damage claimed. 
However, the court can only perform its duty of interpreting the law and applying it 
to the case. The Supreme Court has done its interpretation and held that the High 
Court, which exercised original jurisdiction, had no jurisdiction to try the case by 
virtue of section 230 (1) of Constitution (Suspension Modification) Decree No. 107 
of 1993 and section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution. The case was within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The law therefore is that such cases 
can only be instituted in the Federal High Court. Since the decision in this case, every 
victim is now aware that they must go to the Federal High Court to seek remedy in 
oil pollution cases. 
              The problem of jurisdiction in oil pollution case also arose in Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v. Chief G.B.A Tiebo VII & Ors.61 In that case, the 
Supreme Court had to determine whether the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
upholding jurisdiction of the high court was ultra vires. The Supreme Court referred 
to the Isaiah’s case. It considered that the cause of action in the case accrued on 16th 
January 1987, the suit was commenced on 6th June 1988 and judgment was delivered 
on 27th February 1991 and held that on these various dates, the State High Court had 
jurisdiction over cases in oil spillage because the law applicable to an action is the law 
existing when the cause of action arose.62 The court held that the provision of 
                                                
59 Available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scrips/getcase.pl?narby=cse&court=us&vol=3938 in 
vol=175 accessed 14 August 2013. 
60 Petroleum Act Chapter 10 and Oil Pipe Lines Act 1956 Chapter 07 L.F.N 2004. 
61 [2005] 9 M.J.S.C 158. 
62 See Koya v. Adesina (1993) 6 N.W.L.R (Pt. 298) 182 at 185. 
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Decree 107 of 1993 and section 251 (1) (n) of the 1999 Constitution related only to 
cases arising after 30 December 1991. The Supreme Court also stated that it 
ventured into the Tiebo Case because the issue of jurisdiction was raised. This is to 
emphasize the importance of jurisdiction in the determination of cases. 
 
2.2 JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LESSONS FROM KIOBEL 
        On the international scene, the consciousness of environmental rights activist 
was awakened by the US Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.63 
In 2002, Esther Kiobel, a U.S. resident and the wife of deceased Dr. Barinem Kiobel, 
filed the lawsuit, along with other Ogoni asylees against Shell Corporation. Her 
lawsuit was filed under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a 200-year-old law that has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow federal lawsuits for modern-day 
egregious international law violations. The Ogoni plaintiffs alleged that Shell 
planned, conspired, and facilitated the Nigerian government's extrajudicial 
executions, crimes against humanity, and torture against the Ogoni people. Shell 
argued that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. In Kiobel the Second Circuit 
became the first court of appeals to substantively analyze whether the ATS imposes 
corporate liability.64 
       Amicus briefs in support of the litigants were filed on both sides. The U.S. 
government, Joseph Stiglitz, international law and legal history scholars, and human 
rights advocates (including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights) wrote 
in favour of the Ogoni plaintiffs. Shell's position was supported by another group of 
international law scholars, several foreign governments, and a dozen of the world's 
largest multinational corporations. 
       Many of the defendants in ATS cases have been involved in extractive 
industries such as ExxonMobil in Indonesia, Occidental in Colombia, Talisman in 
Sudan, Shell in Nigeria, Unocal in Burma, and Rio Tinto in Papua New Guinea.65 
Other ATS suits have alleged that Pfizer conducted medical experiments on Nigerian 
children without consent, and that Nestle used child labour to work cocoa 
plantations in the Ivory Coast.66 Even al-Qaeda, has been sued under the ATS.67 The 
cases illustrate the significant goal of ATS plaintiffs: to expose human rights 
violations by trying them in the court of public opinion. Thus, when in 2010 Kiobel 
was dismissed against Shell, the divided Second Circuit panel made headlines, and 
the sweep of the ruling gained immediate attention.68 It was the first appellate69 
decision to hold that the ATS could not be used against corporations.70 
                                                
63 Supra n 11. 
64621 F.3d 111, 131–45 (2d Cir. 2010). 
65ibid. 
66ibid. 
67In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 784 n.16, 785 n.19, 826 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing ATS claims to proceed against al Qaeda and two alleged ‘fronts’ for that 
‘organization’). See also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Juli Schwartz, Saleh v. Titan 
Corporation: The Alien Tort Claims Act: More Bark Than Bite? Procedural Limitations and the Future 
of ATCA Litigation against Corporate Contractors, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 867 (2006); see also Al Shimari 
v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
68Bob Van Voris and Patricia Hurtado, Nigeria Torture Case Decision Exempts Companies from U.S. Alien 
Tort Law (Sep. 17, 2010), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-17/u-s-
corporations-aren-t-subject-to-alientort- law-appeals-court-rules.html. Accessed 06 September 2013. 
69A district court in California reached this same conclusion one week before the Kiobel decision was 
filed. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1132–45 (C.D. Cal. 2010). (The practice of forced 
child labour in cocoa fields in Mali was not actionable because of defendant’s corporate nature). 
70Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 151 note (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J, concurring). 
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       The position taken by the majority appeared to gain steady ground in lower 
courts since the decision was issued in September 2010.71An Indiana district court,72 
for example, dismissed an ATS claim against a corporation, solely on the 
persuasiveness of Kiobel.73 One week later, the same court disposed of a similar case, 
this time on the merits rather than for want of jurisdiction.74 Within the Second 
Circuit, one post-Kiobel dismissal did not even generate a written opinion.75 
        The majority decision has a long reach: Kiobel does not merely stand for the 
principle that corporations cannot be sued on a tort theory of aiding and abetting. 
Rather, it finds that corporate entities cannot violate customary international law 
because they are not subject to it. The majority’s discourse on subjects of 
international law indicates a narrower definition of the word ‘violation’. A violation is 
not merely breaking a rule. Rather, a person or entity is only subject to a rule if he 
can reasonably expect sanctions for noncompliance. 
       The majority opinion is also an exercise in legal formalism in that it avoids 
and even admonishes policy considerations that might favour victims of corporate 
tort. For the majority, strict adherence to established principles of customary 
international law is an end in itself. There is no discussion of the evils addressed by 
the modern line of Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence. 
       Contrary to the majority opinion in Kiobel, the ATS does not require the 
court to look to international law to determine its jurisdiction over ATS claims 
against a particular class of defendant, such as corporations. The first step of 
statutory construction analysis is uncontroversial: the plain language of the statute 
does not exclude any defendant. Secondly, the legislative history indicates no 
Congressional intent to exclude corporate defendants, and the words would not have 
been understood to exclude such defendants at the time of its enactment. Finally, 
another federal statute does enumerate exclusions for foreign sovereigns from ATS 
claims. These well-settled exclusions should inform the more nebulous status of 
corporate defendants.76 
              The implications of the case for environmental justice go well beyond 
multinationals domiciled in countries other than the U.S. The Court sanctioned 
Shell’s desire of not only having the claim against it dismissed but also to negate the 
statutory basis making it possible to use U.S. courts as a forum to adjudicate civil 
liability for gross human rights violations committed abroad - even when those 
violations are committed by U.S. nationals, and even if the Americans are natural 
persons. This is arguably a clear pervasion of justice that renders the application of 
the ATS discriminatory. It is hoped that if and when similar facts are presented in the 
future, the Court would be more cautious in its judgment by reversing itself of this 
dangerous precedent. For now, Kiobel remains the law and arguably a license for 
multinationals to escape justice from the hands of dehumanized victims of oil 
exploration and environmental pollution. 
 
 
                                                
71E.g., Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09-495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010); Mastafa v. 
Chevron Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 
2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
72 Viera v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. supra. 
73Viera, 2010 WL 3893791 at 2. 
74Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. 
75Mastafa, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 298–301 (noting that ATS claims were dismissed in open court). 
76 Daniel Price, Corporate Liability for International Torts: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the 
Alien Torts Statute?, Seton Hall Circuit Review, Volume 8 Issue 1 (Fall 2011). 
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3. TREND OF CASE LAW:  LOCUS STANDI, PRE-ACTION 
NOTICE AND LIMITATION OF ACTION. 
3.1 Locus Standi/Representative Capacity 
 The issue of locus standi will not present a problem to a person whose 
property interests have been damaged in the course of and due to environmental 
pollution or natural resources depletion. Yet, such a person may very well decide not 
to sue for any number of reasons. If regulatory agencies are not then informed or 
where they fail to act there may well be irredeemable damage to the environment, or 
the offender may go unpunished and similar behaviour undeterred. 
 However, a group of citizens or environmental NGOs have a crucial role to 
play as monitors of environmental activities, public educators, motivators, and 
defenders of the environment and are highly organized to mount environmental 
litigation.77 They may because of an inability to show a direct interest other than that 
of their special environmental consciousness and common interest in the 
environment with other citizens be faced with a barrier of standing to sue.78 
The trend of case law, especially in Nigeria is that in order to have standing to sue, 
the plaintiff must exhibit ‘sufficient interest’, that is ‘an interest which is peculiar to 
the plaintiff and not an interest which he shares in common with general members 
of the public.’ The judicial attitude in Nigeria is that a plaintiff who sues for damages 
arising from an environmental abuse must show that he suffered damages.79 In Shell 
Petroleum Development Company Nig. Ltd v Chief Otoko and Others,80 the respondents who 
were plaintiffs at the Bori High Court in Rivers State claim the sum of N499, 855.00 
as compensation payable to the defendants (appellants herein) for injurious affection 
to and deprivation of use of the Andoni Rivers and creeks as a result of the spillage 
of crude oil. The action was brought in a representative capacity. The Court of 
Appeal held that: (a) It is essential that the persons who are to be represented and 
the person(s) representing them should have the same interest in the cause of matter; 
(b) Given common interest and a common grievance a representative suit would be 
in order if in addition to the relief sought it is in its nature beneficial to all whom the 
plaintiff proposes to represent. The Court rejected the purported representative 
action. 
In Adediran and Anor v. Interland Transport Ltd,81 the appellants as residents of 
the Ire-Akari Housing Estate, Isolo, inter alia brought an action for nuisance due to 
noise, vibrations, dust and obstruction of the roads in the estate. The Supreme Court 
dealt with the common law restrictions on the right of a private person to sue on a 
public nuisance. The Court held that in the light of section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 
Constitution, a private person can commence an action on public nuisance without 
the consent of the Attorney-General, or without joining him as a party. 
The approach of the Supreme Court in the above case by abolishing the first 
problem of locus standi in Nigeria is commendable. But the second problem of the 
rule remaining is that the public or group cannot sue by representation and claim 
special damages for individuals when they do not suffer equally. In Amos v. Shell BP 
P.D.C. Ltd,82 the plaintiffs sued the defendants in a representative capacity claiming 
special and general damages. It was alleged that the 2nd defendants as contractors to 
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78 Ibid at pp. 205-222. 
79 Ladan supra note 2 at pp. 117-365. 
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the first, had in the course of oil mining operations built a large earth dam across the 
Plaintiffs’ creek. As a result, farms were flooded and damaged; movement of canoes 
was hampered, and agriculture and commercial life was paralyzed. One of the issues 
was whether special damages could be claimed in a representative action, when the 
plaintiffs suffered unequal losses, or whether the plaintiffs as general public could 
claim for losses suffered by them individually. It was held, dismissing the claim: 
1. That since the creek was a public waterway, its blocking was a 
public nuisance and no individual cold recover damages therefore unless 
he could prove special damage peculiar to himself from the interference 
with a public right. 
2. That since the interest and losses suffered by the plaintiffs were 
separate in character and not communal, they could not maintain an 
action for special representative capacity. 
In N.N.P.C. v. Sele,83 the plaintiffs sued for massive spillage of crude oil from the 
defendant’s pipeline, which polluted and ravaged economic trees and crops, fishing 
ponds, fishing contrivances, local gin distilleries, and fresh water wells over a very 
wide area. They claimed 20,000,000.00 as fair and adequate compensation for their 
losses. At the conclusion of the trial the trial court entered judgment for the 
respondents and awarded N15,329,350.00 as special damages and N3,000,000.00 as 
general damages. 
One of the points taken on appeal was that the trial court was wrong to grant 
leave to the respondents to sue in representative capacity. In his lead judgment 
Muntaka-Coomassie JCA referred to the following dictum of Olatawura JSC, in 
Adeniran v. Interland Transport Ltd: 
 
While in this case it has been shown that they have 
common interest, the grievance of individuals is 
separated and distinct consequently a representative 
action taken as in this case must fail. 
  
The appeal failed because, on the particular issue, it was held that the 
respondents did disclose common grounds and interest in the suit and there were no 
individual claims. This would reduce the valuable Court time devoted to proving all 
the material issues over and over in each individual action. 
It has been argued against the problem posed by the above decision that 
“unlike the non-communal English society in which the rule as to public nuisance 
was developed, in Nigeria people live in communities, especially in the Niger-Delta 
region where the worst incidents of environmental pollution occur. So how they 
share the proceeds of special damages awarded, which is the true worry informing 
the dichotomy of who sues in respect of public nuisance, is not the business of 
anybody.”84 Consequently, if this matter ever went on further appeal, the decision of 
the Supreme Court would be interesting indeed. 
More recently, Justice C.V. Nwokorie of the Federal High Court Benin City 
of Nigeria in Jonah Gbemre v. Shell PDC Ltd and Ors (2005)85 granted leave to the 
applicant to institute these proceedings in a representative capacity for himself and 
for each and every member of the Iweherekan Community in Delta State of Nigeria, 
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an to apply for an order enforcing or securing the enforcement of their fundamental 
human rights to life and human dignity as provided by sections 33 (1) and 34(1) of 
the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, and reinforced by Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the 
African Charter on Human an Peoples’ Right.86 The Court held that these 
constitutionally guaranteed rights inevitably include the rights to clean, poison and 
pollution-free healthy environment. The Judge further declared that the actions of 
the respondents (Shell PDC and NNPC) in continuing to flare gas in the course of 
their oil exploration and production activities in the Applicant’s Community are a 
violation of their fundamental rights. Furthermore, the judge ruled that the failure of 
the companies to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment in the said 
community concerning the effects of their gas flaring activities is a clear violation of 
the E.I.A. Act and has contributed to a further violation of the said environmental 
rights. The judge’s order restrained the respondents from further gas flaring and to 
take immediate steps to stop the further flaring of gas in the community. The Judge 
advised that the Attorney General should ensure the speedy amendment, after due 
consultation with the Federal Executive Council, the Associated Gas Re-Injection 
Act to be in line with Cap.4 of the Constitution on Fundamental Human Rights. But 
the Judge made no award of damages, costs or compensation whatsoever. 
This is a landmark judgment in the sense of application of fundamental 
human rights to an environmental case for the first time in Nigeria, consistent with 
the trend in other jurisdictions like India and South Africa.87 
The trend in other jurisdictions can be seen in the following instances. In the 
USA for instance, individuals and groups have generally been able to meet the 
requirement if they show an injury to their aesthetic, conservation or recreational 
interests.88 In France, the administrative tribunal of Rouen held that an association 
for the promotion of tourism and the protection of nature could present evidence of 
a sufficient interest, given its object as defined in its statutes, to contest an 
authorization for a waste treatment plant. The court also found that labour union, 
notably of companies concerned with chemical industries whose interest were to 
maintain the authorization, also had the right to be heard. Tribunal adminsratif 
deRouen, 8 June 1993, Association Union touristique des amis de la nature et 
autres,89 an appellate court recognized that a nature protection association has 
standing to intervene in a case seeking the annulment of an authorization permitting 
the operation of a uranium mine. However without a showing of material harm, the 
association could not seek damages. 
Where injury is shown, it does not matter the plaintiffs are only a few among 
many similarly affected. See Kajing Tubfk & Other v. Ekran Biid & Others,90 three 
individuals among a community of 10,000 are not deprived of standing or relief 
because of their limited number. In some jurisdictions, traditional property doctrines 
have served to expand standing. In Abdikadir Sheika Hassan and Others v Kenya Wildlife 
Service,91 for example, the court permitted the plaintiff of his own behalf and on 
behalf of his community to bring suit to bar the agency from removing or dislocating 
a rare and endangered species from its natural habitat. The Court observed that 
according to customary law, those entitled to use the land are also entitled to the fruit 
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thereof, including the fauna and flora; thus the applicants had standing to challenge 
the agency action. 
Cases that are characterized as involving infringements of basic rights also 
generally afford broad standing to affected persons. See Festo Balegele and 749 Other v. 
Dar es Salaam City Council (Civil Cause No. 90/1991, High Court Tanzania)(allowing 
residents of a neighborhood to sue the City Council to halt an illegal dump site that 
was found to deliberately expose their lives to danger). Governments, too, must 
demonstrate that they have standing. In Gray Davis et al. v. U.S. EPA (9th Cir. July 
17, 2003), the federal government argued that California lacked standing to challenge 
EPA action denying a waiver from some regulations on air quality. The Court held 
that California was acting to protect its own interests and that furthermore, the 
Governor and state agency had acted in their official capacities with proprietary 
interests in the land, air and water of the state. This the court held to be sufficiently 
concrete to give them standing. 
Where numerous individuals are harmed, as is often the case with 
environmental damage, many jurisdictions allow class actions to be filed by one or 
more members of the group or class of persons who have suffered a similar injury or 
have a similar cause of action. The class action is essentially a procedural device to 
quickly and efficiently dispose of cases where there are a large number of aggrieved 
persons. It helps ensure consistency in judgments and awards of compensation, as 
well as prevents proliferation of separate and individual actions. Petitioners file on 
behalf of themselves and others of their class, representing the others and 
subsequently others are asked to join in. Often public notices are put out asking 
interested persons to join the case. To be maintainable, class actions usually must be 
permitted under the procedural rules of the country, as in the U.S. and in India. Class 
actions may also be permitted, even recommended by courts, as a means to enforce 
the constitutional right to a healthy environmental when the specific facts threaten to 
violate the rights of an undermined number of people. See Jose Cuesta Novoa and 
Miciades Ramirez Melo v. the Secretary of Public Health of Bogota.92 
 Environmental statues and regulations allowing citizen suits, either against an 
administrator for failure to perform a required act or against a person who is 
allegedly in violation of an environmental regulation or standard, have served to 
enlarge the standing of citizens to seek redress through the courts. Broad laws have 
been drafted, for example, in New South Wales, Australia, to allow ‘any person’ to 
commence an action against any other person alleged to be in violation of a permit, 
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order under the law. 
Similar legislation has been adopted in India and the United States. Courts must 
decide how broadly to read the term ‘any person.’ In particular they must determine 
whether the individuals must have some interest adversely affected or whether the 
law was intended to open the doors to all persons taking an interest in the matter, 
acting as private prosecutors. 
 In South Africa, courts have looked to a number of factors to determine 
whether a member of the public has locus standi to prevent the commission of an act 
prohibited by statute: 
• Did the legislature prohibit doing the act in the interests of a 
particular class of persons or was the prohibition merely in the general public 
interest. 
• In the former instance, any person belonging to the class of protected 
persons may interdict the act without proof of any special damage. 
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• For legislation of general interest, the applicant must prove that he or 
she suffered or will suffer special damage as a result of the doing of the act. 
 
Applying these tests to the Environmental Conservation Act of 1989, a court 
in Durban found it to be in the general interest requiring proof of special harm, but 
allowed applicant to proceed on a nuisance claim if she could prove that the 
management and operation of the site in question constituted such nuisance.93 
Some courts have called for reexamining traditional rules of standing in 
environmental matter involving the state, in order to adapt such rules to the 
changing needs of society. In Wildlife Society v. Minister of Environment,94 the Court held 
that a group whose main aim is to promote environmental conservation should have 
standing to apply for an order to compel the state to comply with its statutory 
obligations to protect the environment. Should access to the courts be abused, the 
judiciary may impose appropriate orders of costs to discourage frivolous actions. 
Cases filed by the Secretary General of the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers 
Association similarly led the Supreme Court to hold that any person other than an 
officious intervener or a wayfarer without any interest in the cause may have 
sufficient interest in environmental matters to qualify as a person aggrieved, e.g Dr. 
Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh95 represented by the Secretary Ministry of Irrigation, 
Water Resources and Flood Control and Others. 
 
3.2 PRE-ACTION NOTICE AND LIMITATION OF 
ACTION/STATUTE BAR. 
Another procedural issue in environmental cases is Pre-Action Notice. This was the 
issue in the recent case of Mobil Producing (Nig) Unlimited v. LASEPA, FEPA & 
ORS,96 the Court of Appeal upheld the fatality of the failure on the part of the 
appellant to serve the statutory pre-action notice under Section 30(2) of the FEPA 
Act on the second respondent at the instance of one of the fourth set of 
defendants/respondents. On further appeal to the Supreme Court however, the apex  
court held inter-alia, that the service of a pre-action notice is at best a procedural 
requirement and not an issue of substantive law on  which the right of the plaintiff 
depend. It held further that it is not an integral part of the process of initiating 
proceedings and that a party who has served a pre-action notice is not obliged to 
commence proceeding at all. The non-compliance does not therefore raise the 
question of jurisdiction which can be raised at any time which if resolved in favour 
of the defendant would render the entire proceedings a nullity. It does not abrogate 
the right of a plaintiff to approach the court or defeat its cause of action; it merely 
puts the jurisdiction of the court to hear a matter on hold pending compliance with 
the pre-condition. It is therefore a mere irregularity, which merely renders an action 
incompetent but does not totally affect the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, 
the irregularity can be waived by a defendant who fails to raise it by motion or plead 
it in the statement of defence. 
 The major aim of the mandatory section 29(2) or 30(2) provisions of the 
FEPA Act is not necessarily to enable the Agency prepare its case, but rather to see 
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whether the matter could be settled out of court. Hence, the requirement of pre-
action notice is not inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria.97 
 It is evident from the above that limitation of time is another issue that often 
arises in environmental cases in Nigeria. This is because pollution may be continuous 
or an isolated case, or periodic. The defence naturally tends to urge the Court to hold 
that time runs from when the pollution occurred. The issue of continuing wrong 
arose in Gulf Oil Co. Ltd v Oluba.98 The Appellant commenced oil exploration on the 
Respondents’ land in 1973 and continued until 1989. This injuriously affected 
swamps, channels and lakes resulting in loss of income from fishing and farming. 
The Respondents commenced action some thirteen years later in 1989. The 
Appellant’s took a preliminary objection praying that the action be dismissed in that 
it was statute-barred. In respect of actions founded on tort, the applicable Limitation 
Law (of Delta State) provided for six years of limitation from the date on which the 
cause of action accrued. The trial judge held that the cause of action was a 
continuing one and not statute-barred. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal called the trial judge’s decision “outlandish” 
because the words he relied on in reaching his decision, that is, “unless the wrong or 
act is a continuing one,” are not to be found in Section 4 of the Law. The Court of 
Appeal held that the cause of action accrued with the cessation of the Appellants act, 
which resulted in the damage. It held further that the trial judge was wrong to look at 
the statement of defence to see whether it admitted that the cause of action was a 
continuing one. There might admittedly have been some weakness in the pleading of 
the Respondents’ case by their counsel in the Gulf v. Oluba case. But even so, there 
was sufficient ground for the Court of Appeal taking the opposite view, and not 
abandoning such a vast quantity of land to permanent ecological ruin, when the 
appellant could have restored the land. 
 
3.3 Burden of Proof and Remedies.  
 In order to enable the Courts to enforce environmental laws, the parties must 
prove their cases, as required by law. This is a common procedure in litigation and 
not unique to environmental law. What could be unique is if the particular 
environmental statute requires a particular burden or standard or proof in a 
particular matter. Meeting the requisite burden of proof in environmental cases have 
most times been difficult particularly in civil cases. 
 
3.3.2 Proof in Civil Cases. 
 Apart from the statutory burden of proof laid down in the Evidence Act,99 
and under the Common Law, the burden of proof in civil cases is on the 
preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities.100 And in most cases, the 
burden is on the plaintiff.101 Usually the burden lies on him who desires the court to 
make any pronouncement in his favour as to any legal rights on the existence of facts 
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to which he asserts.102 Likewise the party who was brought upon some allegations 
made against him is duty bound to satisfy the court that those allegations are 
unfounded. The nature of the obligation on the parties will depend on the 
requirements of the substantive law upon which the action arises and the rules of 
evidence.  Environmental pollution cases are civil cases in which the parties are 
expected to make proofs on the preponderance of evidence or balance of 
probabilities.  
Generally in environmental litigation, the following proofs are necessary: - 
where the claim is damaged to property, the plaintiff must prove ownership of the 
property damaged.103 In a claim for loss or destruction of farm crops, farm land and 
economic trees, the court held in Uhunmwangbo v. Uhunmwangbo104 that the plaintiff 
must adduce sufficient evidence to show inter alia: the name, nature, and number of 
economic trees allegedly destroyed. For an action in negligence or nuisance, the 
ingredients of the offence must be established.105 For a claim in special damages, the 
claims must be itemized and specially proved. In R.C.C. (Nig) Ltd v. Edonwonyi the 
court held that a claim of loss of earning is a claim in special damages in the sense 
that full particulars must be given.106 Such facts as rate of earning and other facts that 
will enable the court to determine the claim in arithmetical calculation should be 
pleaded. In a claim of highly technical and professional nature107 which the court 
would not ordinarily appreciate, the plaintiff needs to go extra mile to establish his 
claim through expert evidence.108 In A.R.C v. J.D.P109 the court stated that a counsel 
presenting a case is expected to argue his client’s case convincingly and assist the 
court to arrive at the right decision. 
 The difficulty encountered by victims of environmental pollution in the issue 
of remedy lies on the problem of claim and proof. This problem arose in at the 
Supreme Court in the case of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v. Chief 
G.B.A. Tiebo VII & Ors. In this case, the plaintiffs commenced action at the Yenagoa 
High Court claiming the sum of N64,146,000.00 as special and general damages 
arising from the defendant’s negligence.110  This was a result of crude oil spill on the 
lands, creeks, lakes and shrines of the plaintiff from the defendant’s oil mining 
activities. The plaintiffs claimed specific sums as special damages for losses arising 
from pollution of fishponds, damages to communal fishing nets and raffia palms. 
They also claimed specific sums as general damages. The trial court awarded 
damages of N400,000.00 and N600,000.00 as general damage for loss of raffia palms 
and loss of drinking water respectively; N5 million as general damages and N1 
million as costs to the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal to the Court of Appeal was 
dismissed. The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court. The problems 
canvassed before the Supreme Court were: whether it was proper for the court 
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below to award special damages when there was no sufficient proof? Whether the 
amount awarded as general damages and cost was too high and unnecessary? 
 In dealing with this challenge, the Supreme Court held that ‘anyone making a 
claim in special damages must prove strictly that he did suffer such special damages 
claimed. According to Tobi, J.S.C., ‘proof of special damages is strict. Where plaintiff 
is unable to prove special damages, his case crumbles and a trial court cannot 
compensate him by way of general damages.’ According to Oguntade, J.S.C, the 
plaintiffs in their claim pleaded the nature of the damage in paragraphs 9-14. In 
paragraph 17, they set out the particulars of special damages claimed and in 
paragraphs 31 they expressed their claims. He stated that the rule in special damages 
requires the claimant to establish his entitlement by credible evidence of such 
character, as would suggest that he is entitled to an award under that head. In some 
cases it may be unnecessary. The important thing is that the evidence proffered must 
be qualitative and credible and as such lend itself to quantification. However general 
damages need not be proved strictly as they are regarded as damages resulting from 
defendant’s tortuous conduct. This is good law because where there is no strict proof 
of special damages there exists the tendency for a judge to make estimations. In this 
case, the plaintiff could not strictly prove the loss to the raffia palms a cost of 
purchasing alternative drinking water and water used for domestic purposes yet the 
court below awarded N400,000.00 and N600,000.00 damages respectively for these.  
According to Edozie J.S.C. the requirement of strict proof definitely excludes 
a situation where the court will be left in a situation where it will start to guess what 
the losses due to the plaintiff should be. The making of estimation should therefore 
not be allowed. This is exactly what happened in this case. The trial court awarded 
special damages without proof. He said the general damage was in lieu of a claim for 
special damages. This is incorrect because there was claim for special damages. The 
problem was that the plaintiff could not establish sufficient proof for the claims. The 
Supreme Court did not hesitate to condemn such attitude and practice. The court 
distinguished between special and general damages111 and held that since the 
plaintiffs failed to prove their entitlement to the special damages, the trial court erred 
in awarding general damages in place of special damages. The trial court was wrong 
to treat a claim, which failed under special damages as successful under general 
damages. The trial court even claimed that the award of general damages was a way 
of compensating the plaintiffs for the loss of expected profits and freight of goods, 
which according to the court was proved, but not on the writ. This cannot be 
justified. According to Tobi, J.S.C, the issue whether a court can award general 
damages in place of special damages does not exist. 
 For the award in general damages, the Supreme Court stated that the courts 
are at discretion in the award of general damages. Such award will depend on 
assessment based on certain considerations.  It is only when they are manifestly too 
excessive or too low that the court will interfere. In this case there was evidence of 
excessive damage to crops, farms, farmlands, ponds, creeks and widespread 
environmental pollution so the court did not interfere with the award of N5 million. 
This is good judgement because environmental pollution cases are not mere civil 
cases and with the extent of damage, inadequate remedial attention may render the 
farmlands etc infertile for a long time therefore the award of N5 million is not 
excessive neither is the N1 million costs too high. This is because of the cost of 
getting such a case from the High Court through the Supreme Court. 
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 In such problems of proof, where victims make wrong claims and cannot 
substantiate their claims with adequate proofs, the Supreme Court strives to give 
adequate remedy e.g. in the Tiebo case, the court did not interfere with the award of 
N5 million as general damages. However the Supreme Court understands the 
predicament of the victims but regrets that victims who have good cases but do not 
satisfy the stipulations under the law and rules of proceedings have themselves to 
blame. As Tobi, J.S.C stated ‘general damages cannot be a compensation for special 
damages. In it’s strived to ensure that justice is done, the Supreme Court in some 
cases infers negligence from the facts before it and dispense with the requirement of 
proof. In Machine Umudje v. Shell112 the Supreme Court stated that it could draw 
necessary inference of negligence and it did just that. In such cases, the Supreme 
Court also applied the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to hold the defendant strictly liable 
without proof. This helps lighten the task of the victims. This presumption enables 
justice to be done. The Supreme Court has also applied the presumption of res ipsa 
loquitur to assist victims. This presumption enables justice to be done when the facts 
beaming on causation and the care exercised by the defendant are at the outset 
legally unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be within the knowledge of the 
defendant. In Royal Ade v. National Oil,113 Ejiwunmi, J.S.C held that the presumption 
of res ipsa loquitur is used to fasten liability on the defendant. Such presumption will 
aid victims of environmental pollution, who because of their limited knowledge 
cannot prove negligence. 
 However the grant of remedy may likely be affected by the attitude of the 
court and the limited number of courts that can exercise jurisdiction to grant remedy 
in environmental litigation. In Allar Irou v. Shell B.P Development Company (Nigeria) 
Limited114 the court denying the injunction stated that ‘to grant the injunction would 
amount to asking the defendant to stop operating in the area… and cause  the 
stoppage of a trade… mineral which is the main source of the country’s revenue’. 
Such consideration is not in the interest of the facts of the case presented to the 
court. The plaintiff should at least receive some remedy for the harm caused to him. 
It is believed that such attitude from the court is not likely to arise in this present 
time. Also with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in oil pollution 
cases in Nigeria. Will the number of Courts available not affect the chances of 
victims obtaining remedy? Can the Federal High Courts cope with the volume of 
litigation arising from petroleum operations?115 Will this not cause an increase in 
sabotage incidents and related acts of hostage taking? For example, it appears 
unlikely that the plaintiff’s in Abel Isaiah’s case will start all over in the Federal High 
Court neither does it appear that all of them will accept the decision. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 As discussed in this paper, a number of technical and substantive issues 
continue to create barriers to environmental justice in Nigeria. If these technicalities 
are to be ameliorated, the Nigerian judiciary would have a broader role to play; 
specifically in applying the law with more flexibility and in fostering a milieu for 
creative judicial reasoning. It has been demonstrated that peculiar facts of the 
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country’s socio-economy, culture and law make it imperative for the judiciary to take 
an activist, critical and creative stance as the last hope for the common man and 
woman. Due to ongoing corruption, neglect and the evident failure of the political 
class in implementing sustainable environmental policies, the Nigerian judiciary is 
often looked upon, and rightly so, to prompt and foster effective environmental 
management, as well as to emphasize the importance of public participation in 
environmental conservation and management in Nigeria.116 
 There is a lot of merit in the public interest litigation device and an attitude 
of judicial activism by the judiciary in environmental matters, not only because 
administrative and legislative review of administrative action is weak and judicial 
review dependant on the accident of litigation, but also because of the grave 
consequences of delinquent environmental management in the socio-economic life 
of a developing nation such as Nigeria. No doubt these concepts will have to 
emphasized consistently and aggressively in the courts, to prompt the desired change 
in the Nigerian legal and socio-cultural landscape. Nigerian courts may be guided by 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 1992, which 
admonishes that:  
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, 
each individual shall have appropriate access to information on 
the environment that is held by public authorities, including 
information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-
making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings; including redress and remedy shall be provided. 
  
Environmental justice may only be realistically achieved in Nigeria when 
there is ample opportunity for victims of environmental problems to obtain redress 
in law courts. When victims are unable to obtain redress either due to technical or 
substantive barriers, it breeds apathy on the part of the people in the area of 
environmental litigation, and this is never a good situation for a nation to find itself. 
In order to awaken belief in the judicial systems as arbiters of redress and justice, the 
Nigerian judiciary must take more proactive roles, which involves widening locus 
standi requirements, not allowing technicalities to stand in the way of substantive 
environmental issues and also preventing gold digging applications that stand on the 
path of serious environmental cases. 
                The recent failed attempt at outsourcing environmental claim in Kiobel may 
be an important reminder and a lesson that we must look inwards in the search for 
environmental justice. The Nigerian judiciary must begin to play a more proactive 
role in breaking the barriers to environmental justice, and in removing technical 
obstacles that prevent victim from obtaining redress.  
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